IMPLEMENTING THE GCTF GOOD PRACTICES ON STRENGTHENING NATIONAL-LOCAL COOPERATION IN PREVENTING AND COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM CONDUCIVE TO TERRORISM

MAPPING STRENGTHS AND CHALLENGES IN EAST AND SOUTHERN AFRICA

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ACRONYMS

ATP	Antiterrorism Proclamation
CAS	Comprehensive Approach to Security
CEF	County Engagement Forum
CIDP	County Integrated Development Plan
CiSCAVE	Civil Society Coalition Against Violent Extremism
CREATE	Collective Resilience Against Extremism
CSO	Civil society organisation
CSR	Corporate social responsibility
CT	Counterterrorism
CT MORSE	Counter-Terrorism Monitoring, Reporting and Support Mechanism
CVE	Countering violent extremism
DDR	Deradicalisation, disengagement and reintegration
EU	European Union
FBO	Faith-based organisation
FGS	Federal Government of Somalia
FMS	Federal member states
GCERF	Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund
GCTF	Global Counterterrorism Forum
ICEPCVE	IGAD Centre of Excellence for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
INGO	International non-governmental organisation
LAP	Local action plan
LNG	Liquified natural gas
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MIA	Ministry of Internal Affairs
MINALOC	Ministry of Local Government
MoP	Ministry of Peace
NAP	National action plan
NCTC	National Counter Terrorism Centre
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NLC	National-local cooperation

NSAP	National strategy and action plan
NSCVE	National strategy to counter violent extremism
NTC	National Technical Committee
OKR	Objectives and key results
PVE	Prevention of violent extremism
P/CVE	Preventing and countering violent extremism
RALGA	Rwanda Association of Local Government Authorities
R-ARCSS	Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan
RCAP	Rapid County Action Plan
REMVE	Racially or ethnically motivated violent extremism
RUSI	Royal United Services Institute
SCN	Strong Cities Network
SFCG	Search for Common Ground
SOSWENSA	Southwest Non-State Actors
TST	Transnational security threats
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VE	Violent extremism

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Released in September 2020, the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) Memorandum on *GCTF Good Practices for Strengthening National-Local Cooperation for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism Conducive To Terrorism*[1] was designed with the understanding that national-local cooperation (NLC) is an essential component of preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE). The document details 13 Good Practices for P/CVE actors to consider as they look to enhance coordination and cooperation between national and local government, civil society organisations (CSOs) and the private sector.

As part of a broader GCTF initiative to implement the Good Practices led by the Strong Cities Network (SCN) and with funding support from the European Union's (EU) Counter-Terrorism Monitoring, Reporting and Support Mechanism (CT MORSE), the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) was tasked with taking stock of the implementation of the 13 Good Practices across nine countries in eastern and southern Africa, namely Ethiopia, Mozambique, Somalia, Tanzania, Djibouti, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan and Uganda.

The mapping reveals that only a few have even made a start in establishing national P/CVE frameworks, let alone at the local level. Only **Kenya** has made progress against every one of the Good

Practices. Other countries, namely **Somalia** and **Uganda**, have produced national frameworks for P/CVE. Both outline whole-of-society approaches and talk about ways in which local actors and national governments can work together. However, neither have made significant progress in implementing these plans. A third category, including **Djibouti**, **Tanzania**, **Ethiopia** and **Mozambique**, have engaged with non-coercive approaches to countering the threat of violent extremism (VE) but lack the formal frameworks or legislation to guide work in this sector. Finally, **Burundi**, **Rwanda** and **South Sudan** have to date failed to engage in P/CVE and have conducted negligible work in this space.

Findings from this study indicate that there are several significant obstacles to NLC:

1 Perhaps most significantly, almost all financing for P/CVE work is provided by foreign donors, meaning that countries are often constrained by an international agenda that may not be in alignment with local understandings and priorities.

2 The prioritisation of counterterrorism (CT) measures over prevention methods has undermined trust and engagement between national and local actors.

3 The P/CVE space is blurred between the development and security spheres, with the latter edging out local actors.

4 Decentralisation remains nascent in some contexts, which limits the authority of local actors and produces an imbalance in the power dynamics between the national government and local decision-makers.

5 Corruption has permeated every aspect of governance in some parts of the region, undermining trust and transparency.

6 Ongoing conflict and broad insecurity has meant that P/CVE is often deprioritised in favour of CT measures.

7 A lack of institutional and technical capacity at state level means that CSOs are usually left with the burden of implementing P/CVE measures.

Other findings reveal that there is a lack of consistency in the use of P/CVE terminology, which some view as a Western concept and may be suspicious of it. The conflation of and uncertainty around terms such as prevention of violent extremism (PVE), countering violent extremism (CVE), CT, VE, as well as the type of response they warrant and which actors should be involved, has generated fear and unease on the part of local government and civil society to involve themselves in the sphere.

Local governments across the region remain largely underutilised with regards to P/CVE, with no countries other than Kenya and Somalia having measures in place for local action plans (LAPs). Moreover, many local governments view P/CVE as a security matter which, combined with a lack of technical capacity and a sense that security is not within their mandate, has led to the burden of implementing initiatives falling upon the shoulders of civil society. While CSOsare increasingly being called upon as experts and implementers in the P/CVE sphere, many lack the capacity, financing and economies of scale necessary for sustainable programming, or are limited by other factors.

Lastly, while national action plans (NAPs) for P/CVE are being actively developed, many remain isolated. This not only limits their effectiveness by preventing their mainstreaming into existing multidisciplinary approaches, but can place them in competition with other related priorities such as development, education and conflict resolution, and further reinforces the association of P/CVE as a security issue. National frameworks for P/CVE are an essential first step in facilitating NLC, but there needs to be greater recognition that addressing the threat of violent extremism is a long-term endeavour that requires continued commitment from all stakeholders.

This research will inform a toolkit, due to be launched in 2023, which will provide guidance and support

to stakeholders on how the Global Counterterrorism Forum's Memorandum on Good Practices on Strengthening NLC in P/CVE Conducive To Terrorism. This NLC implementation toolkit will focus on specific NLC thematic areas, such as multi-disciplinary interventions, rehabilitating and reintegrating returning foreign terrorist fighters and their families, and community engagement.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

1 **Clearer definitions of terms can help minimize confusion, suspicion and resentment of P/CVE and may allow for more local government involvement in addressing violent extremism within their communities.** P/CVE for instance is often viewed as a Western construct and many actors are therefore suspicious of it and its intent. It is similarly conflated with CT and is therefore associated with the security sector, which is typically under the control of the national government in these regions. Both have created uncertainty on the part of local government and civil society on how to engage appropriately.

2 **Strengthening the role of civil society can lead to organic locally-led initiatives.** Civil society is playing an increasing role in the local-level implementation of P/CVE initiatives and are increasingly being called upon by national governments and international donors to implement or offer expertise to P/CVE projects . However, many remain underutilised, underfunded or lack the freedom to operate to their fullest extent. There are examples of organic, locally-led initiatives that could benefit from external funding and technical support.

3   **The needs of local actors should be reflected and integrated into NAPs through consultation processes**. Local actors are often excluded entirely from the NAP drafting process, or else included only superficially. Improved consultation and communication processes with local actors and reflecting their needs can help break down the siloes between these two levels and generate much-needed transparency and accountability.

4   **Enhancing local government roles through LAPs and effective use of local coordination mechanisms.** The role of local government remains underutilised in P/CVE, with no countries other than Kenya and Somalia having measures in place for LAPs and few examples of local governments being involved in developing or implementing P/CVE initiatives. Local coordination mechanisms exist, but are usually either rudimentary or non-functional.

5   **P/CVE is neither effective nor sustainable in isolation and must be mainstreamed into existing approaches and streams of work where possible.** This includes not only existing multidisciplinary approaches outside of conflict, such as development, education, and youth and women, but also existing local government and civil society efforts.

6   **There is a lack of trust between national and local actors which has hindered collaboration to effective and holistic P/CVE efforts.** A greater focus on building trust and inclusivity between these actors through fora, coordination mechanisms and consultations, can help to break down barriers and siloes between these two levels.

MAPPING STRENGTHS AND CHALLENGES IN EAST AND SOUTHERN AFRICA

INTRODUCTION

In September 2020, the GCTF adopted a Memorandum on strengthening NLC in P/CVE Conducive To Terrorism.[2] This was in order to recognise that such cooperation between national and local actors, including local CSOs and local authorities, is an essential ingredient for translating global P/CVE frameworks and recommendations into local action. The document encourages a whole-of-society approach and details 13 Good Practices for P/CVE stakeholders to consider for enhancing coordination and cooperation among national and local government, CSOs, and the private sector. These are outlined below:

1   Identify the barriers or other challenges to NLC

2   Identify, delineate, and respect the comparative advantages of the different levels of P/CVE conducive to terrorism actors.

3   Lead an inclusive, consultative, multilayered national dialogue on P/CVE.

4   Develop and promote an inclusive national P/CVE framework that reflects the perspectives of a diversity of national and local government and non-government actors.

5   Invest in local actors, frameworks and programmes.

6   Build and strengthen trust.

7   Facilitate appropriate information sharing between P/CVE actors while protecting privacy.

8   Enable and promote effective coordination, communication, and collaboration among national and local stakeholders relevant to the design and implementation of a P/CVE NAP or other relevant national framework.

9   Balance national leadership and local ownership in P/CVE efforts.

10   Encourage sustainable funding to support local implementation of national P/CVE frameworks.

11   Provide or otherwise support tailored training and other P/CVE capacity building.

12   Sustain political support for P/CVE efforts.

13   Enable the effective and sustained monitoring and evaluation of national and local P/CVE frameworks and programs.

The Good Practices are non-binding but provide guidelines for all actors in the P/CVE space to facilitate a whole-of-society approach. They acknowledge that while tackling VE is often seen as the responsibility of the national government, a variety of subnational and other stakeholders have a role to play. Coordination, cooperation, and information sharing necessitates the involvement of both state and non-state actors, working at international, national, and local levels. The GCTF's Good Practices encourage greater dialogue and improved NLC. They also provide guidance on pragmatic elements necessary for a functioning P/CVE ecosystem, including monitoring and evaluation (M&E), funding, and capacity building.

As part of a broader GCTF NLC Good Practices' implementation initiative led by the SCN, and with funding support from the EU's CT MORSE, RUSI was tasked with taking stock of the implementation of the 13 Good Practices across a number of countries in eastern and southern Africa. The exercise included the following:

Burundi	Ethiopia	Mozambique	Somalia	Tanzania
Djibouti	Kenya	Rwanda	South Sudan	Uganda

This report looks at each of the 13 Good Practices, identifying where countries have policies, programmes and/or platforms in place to implement the recommendations and where there is room for improvement. Examples of particularly promising approaches are highlighted, especially contexts where civil society works in harmony with local and national government. Both horizontal and vertical coordination mechanisms are outlined. However, obstacles to cooperation are also considered, particularly when shared by multiple countries. In several cases, structures are in place 'on paper' which encourage inclusion, but concerns are raised over genuine participation and ownership. Therefore, it was important to consider how mechanisms play out in practice.

The mapping is based on both a desktop review of existing literature and informal interviews with key actors, including from civil society. The first step in this process was to look at each country's experiences with P/CVE to date, reviewing coordination mechanisms, agencies, budgets, and frameworks both at a national and local level. As expected, the information available is much more detailed for some countries (e.g., Kenya and Somalia) than it is in others (e.g., South Sudan, Rwanda, and Burundi). In some cases, minimal P/CVE work has been carried out and there is a lack of P/CVE architecture in place.

The GCTF encourages the use of existing bodies and programmes to implement the Good Practices. So, in countries like South Sudan, the most relevant parallel existing structures for P/CVE work are considered as proxies.

Many of the GCTF Good Practices are interconnected, especially once they are applied to specific contexts. Examples are included when they demonstrate the successful implementation of more than one of the recommendations.

1. BARRIERS TO NATIONAL-LOCAL COOPERATION IN EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AFRICA

Identify the barriers or other challenges to national-local cooperation

The first GCTF Good Practice concerns the identification of barriers to NLC in the P/CVE space. The Memorandum provides that there can be societal challenges, policy challenges, and those related to coordination, coherence and capacity. Here, several themes emerge which limit cooperation between national and local actors.

Financial resources

As discussed under Good Practice 10, an over-reliance on external funding prevents local ownership and limits the sustainability of whole-of-society approaches to P/CVE. National governments are under-resourced and rely on donors to support P/CVE efforts. In **Mozambique**, structures such as the North Integrated Development Agency (ADIN) appear to have been created primarily as instruments to attract foreign funds.[3] In **Kenya**, the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) objects to the fact that donors sometimes bypass the agency, providing funds directly to civil CSOs and reducing opportunities for national coordination. Kenya's county action plans (CAPs) have proven financially unsustainable due to a failure of county governments to integrate the plans into budgets. Government departments and local organisations in **Somalia** lack the technical, financial, and institutional capacity to carry out their mandates in relation to both prevention work and deradicalisation, disengagement, and reintegration (DDR).[4] Even related efforts rely on external donations, such as **Rwanda's** decentralisation policy.

Competition for resources also limits cooperation and information sharing between civil society actors, with non-governmental organisations (NGOs) fighting for the same sources of funds. In **Uganda**, rivalry between CSOs was cited by one interviewee for their exclusion by the National Technical Committee (NTC) from the initial phases of the development of the national P/CVE strategy.[5] However, since 2019, Uganda's NTC has engaged civil society in its development of the national P/CVE strategy and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has facilitated dialogue through the Civil Society Coalition Against Violent Extremism (CiSCAVE). This initiative led to the inclusion of two civil society figures at the NTC.

Instability

In **Somalia**, vertical linkages, coordination, and information sharing between different tiers of government are fraught, if not completely absent. This reflects the difficulty of operationalising policy amid chronic state weakness and ongoing conflict. The Somali state is still nascent with only a provisional constitution in place and ongoing disputes between the national government and the federal member states (FMS) over resources, tax collection, and legal dispensation.

Similarly, **South Sudan** still relies on its transitional constitution. The country's first decade was characterised by civil conflict. P/CVE has not been a priority. The focus has understandably been on economic recovery and the consolidation of peace.[6] The disaggregation of local government entities has been the source of intense dispute. As part of the 2018 Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) peace deal, South Sudan returned to a system of 10 states, following a fraught five-year experiment with 28 and then 32 states.[7]

Corruption

Public sector mismanagement of funds and corruption were raised by numerous interviewees across the region as factors undermining trust between stakeholders and preventing cooperation between state and non-state actors. Corruption is a major obstacle to trust in **Mozambique**, between national and local government and between government and civil society.[8] Ongoing scandals and a perception that corruption permeates every aspect of the state undermine efforts to build a social contract between the public sector and civilians, reinforcing a feeling that the state benefits from insecurity.[9]

In **Kenya**, corruption also limits transparency between CSOs and the government. The police service – the most immediate representation of the state at a local level – is particularly plagued by accusations. But trust in other local officials – including chiefs, elders, and Nyumba Kumi representatives – is also undermined by allegations of the misuse of public funds.[10] Relationships between communities and local officials are often dependent on individual personalities and their connections.[11]

Although **Burundi** and **South Sudan** are yet to develop P/CVE policies, NLC in both countries is undermined by the perception of public fraud. In Burundi, the country's CT unit has been marred by allegations of corruption and inadequate resourcing.[12] In South Sudan, revenues from the oil fields are allegedly diverted into the private accounts of elites.

Centralised governments

The nature of the **Mozambican** state is itself a significant barrier to NLC. Power is centralised and the state operates a strictly top-down model. The de facto one-party system has given rise to a passive civil society and bureaucratic culture in government. Inertia purportedly undermines activity from the bottom.[13] To achieve anything meaningful at a local level, support and agreement from the central government in Maputo is said to be essential.[14]

With the first decade of **South Sudan's** independence characterised by frequent changes to the make-up of local government boundaries, state authorities remain weak and often unable to implement what the national authorities need.[15] Juba is accused of failing to provide sufficient resources to local government as the centre seeks to employ the 'politics of domination'.[16]

Similar limitations affect deradicalisation and rehabilitation efforts in **Somalia**. The National Intelligence and Security Agency is responsible for categorising and processing high and low-risk individuals but relies on a raft of local administrative bodies and paramilitary outfits to receive and screen prospective defectors. The application of DDR protocols requires clear lines of communication but many FMS security services are disconnected from their parent institutions at the federal level.[17] Symptomatic of what conflict and security professor Alice Hills brands a 'security arena' – where delineations between militia, police, and the army remain interchangeable, defined more by an

'informal economy of clans, conflict and entrepreneurialism' than any sectoral organisation – this fluidity and fragmentation have disrupted any bid to centralise or standardise command and control. It is a problem that characterises Somali programming and policymaking more generally.[18]

Security as a function of the national government

National governments across eastern Africa are keen to maintain close control of anything related to the security domain. Conceptual challenges in defining P/CVE and the sector's uneasy position somewhere between security and development can mean it's unclear who is responsible for implementing P/CVE. This makes it difficult for local government and civil society to operate freely. For example, considering the **Mozambican** government's desire to manage the security space, P/CVE remains a difficult terrain for civil society. To alleviate state scrutiny, it is likely that much of the work conducted in this space is framed as 'peacebuilding', drawing on lessons learned from the post-civil war period.[19]

There is uncertainty in **Kenya** over the extent to which civil society and local government can become involved in some of the more downstream aspects of P/CVE. Under Kenya's devolved system, security is a function of the national government and Nairobi is often reluctant to share information regarding security issues with those at county level.[20] With efforts to combat al-Shabaab framed as a security matter and P/CVE poorly understood among local bureaucrats, county governments have been unsure how they should interact with the CAPs and whether they should be dedicating limited county funds towards something that may be the preserve of the national authorities.[21]

> *"County governments are responsible for implementing CAPs, which are inherently security-related, despite the fact that security is not a devolved function."*[22]

Preoccupation with counterterrorism

Several countries in the region remain preoccupied with a coercive response, failing to recognise the potential parallel role that can be played by a P/CVE framework. This obstacle is acute in **Mozambique**, where the government limits civil society access to affected areas and has suggested that it needs to eliminate the threat before preventive methods can be adopted. **Ethiopia's** Ministry of Peace (MoP), the lead agency on P/CVE, is dominated by security personnel.[23] **Uganda's** recently produced P/CVE strategy was largely led by security personnel. Even in **Kenya**, CT laws have undermined relationships between civil society and the national government.[24]

Capability and knowledge of P/CVE

While the scope and capability of local civic infrastructure has increased across the region, any appraisal of CSO efficacy also needs to be disaggregated: many lack the capacity, financing, and economies of scale necessary for sustainable programming; are susceptible to politicisation and co-optation; exclude key actors; misappropriate the P/CVE label as a pretext for attracting foreign funding; or have little access to or credibility with target audiences. In Kenya, despite several years of P/CVE work and multiple training courses, the general understanding of P/CVE remains weak and CSOs are heterogenous in 'their disposition, capacity, partnerships and networks, operational scope, and experience'.[25] Additionally, Somalia's wider humanitarian space appears 'sparsely connected', and analysis shows international NGOs (INGOs) tend to collaborate more with Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) agencies and regional entities than local civil society, relegating CSOs to the fringes of mainstream development networks.[26] In South Sudan, CSOs have called for training 'to understand how their efforts can contribute to P/CVE'.[27] As recognised by the GCTF Good Practices, without a better understanding of P/CVE programming and the varied drivers of VE, stakeholders are not positioned to collaborate.

2. STAKEHOLDERS AND ACTORS

Identify, delineate, and respect the comparative advantages of the different levels of P/CVE actors

The second Good Practice articulated by the GCTF concerns the varying roles that can be played by P/CVE actors at all levels of society. The document outlines the comparative advantages of both national and local governments. Aligning with UN Security Council resolutions, the GCTF recognises that the state has the primary responsibility for countering the threat of terrorism but states the importance of a multi-sectoral, multi-stakeholder, and multi-disciplinary approach. Whereas the central government may be best placed to provide strategic guidance and resources, other stakeholders are usually in a better position to apply these to a local context. With the caveat that national laws must be respected, the GCTF suggests that countries consider the comparative advantages of local government, civil society, the private sector, and international, regional and subregional bodies, and the complementarity of their roles in P/CVE.

National government

The structure of government varies across the region. Although most countries have adopted relatively centralised systems of governance, some have devolved more powers to local government than others.

In a number of countries in the region, the national government coordinates work on P/CVE. For example, in **Kenya**, all such activity – both national and subnational – is overseen by the NCTC. This permanent agency, established in 2004, reports directly to the office of the president and drives the P/CVE agenda.[28] Among its mandated responsibilities, the NCTC's prevention and resilience branch coordinates and deconflicts all donor-funded P/CVE activities in the country.[29] The NCTC works closely with civil society to provide guidance and ensure that activities are implemented in the areas most at need.[30] The centre serves as a repository for research and is positioned to guide good practice. The NCTC works with other branches of government – such as the Ministry of Education – to implement various aspects of the national strategy.[31] The NCTC coordinates implementation of the strategy, including managing the distribution of resources, setting priorities and working with local stakeholders. The strategy is cascaded to subnational level through CAPs.[32]

In **Uganda**, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) is the principal entity responsible for the coordination of both CT and P/CVE interventions. The country's national P/CVE strategy was developed by the NTC, an agency formed by the MIA and made up mainly of security personnel. The action plan associated with the strategy calls for the establishment of a national coordinating centre for P/CVE which will be responsible for implementation.

In **Tanzania**, the National Counter Terrorism Committee (NCTC) serves as the focal point for engagement on P/CVE.[33] The agency sits within the Ministry of Home Affairs and, with the support of the UN Development Programme (UNDP) has been working on a P/CVE action plan for several years. Unlike its counterpart in Kenya, Tanzania's NCTC which was formed in 2005, is not a legal entity as it is not backed by any legislation. Rather it is an interagency unit composed of officers from the intelligence, police, defence, immigration, and prisons services.[34] This limitation makes stakeholder engagement with P/CVE actors challenging as the centre cannot enter into any memoranda of

understanding.[35] However, the centre does collaborate with other government agencies and with public universities to conduct research on VE.

Somalia's National Strategy and Action Plan (NSAP) has become a key component of the Comprehensive Approach to Security (CAS), a multilateral framework designed to support federal and subnational state-building efforts.[36] This theoretically nests P/CVE within a more holistic, mutually reinforcing approach to security provision.[37]

These examples demonstrate efforts on the part of national governments to lead from the top in setting the agenda. Other countries in the region are yet to appoint any official body to manage P/CVE work. There is no institution in **Mozambique**, for example, that is responsible for P/CVE.[38] Similarly, **Burundi**, **Rwanda** and **South Sudan** have no national focal points. Ethiopia's P/CVE work is managed by the MoP, which was established in 2018, but no NAP has been put in place. In some parts of the region, P/CVE is understandably not considered a priority by either the government or the public. Urgent and more daily concerns relating to structural challenges often dominate the agenda and may be more politically expedient ways of spending money. In **South Sudan**, for instance, an interviewee stressed that the 'main challenge would be to convince the authorities that [P/CVE] is needed'.[39]

Local government

Kenya presents a good practice for local government involvement in P/CVE, with the CAPs managed by a County Engagement Forum (CEF). The first CAPs (Kwale, then Mombasa) were launched in 2017. A total of ten counties subsequently completed their respective plans, which stipulated the agenda over a five-year period.[40] Following the January 2019 al-Shabaab attack against the 14 Riverside complex in Nairobi, the president directed the remaining 37 counties to develop Rapid CAPs (RCAPs).[41] The RCAPs contain one-year plans and focused on the most urgent priorities.[42] In theory the CEFs serve as steering committees bringing together national and local government actors, civil society, the private sector, religious leaders, traditional elders, youth groups, and women's groups.[43]

In **Somalia**, fraught relationships between FMSs and the national government have made consistency between national and local efforts challenging. However, mechanisms for converting the national strategy into local action have been designed, at least on paper. The P/CVE coordination unit at a national level should steer, regulate and convene a cluster of individual focal points at the regional level, appointed and empowered by each respective FMS president. These stakeholders are mandated to develop their own granulated P/CVE action plans, catering to the specificities of their different contexts but with the theoretical aim of 'knitting horizontally across administrative boundaries' and aligning with the broader contours prescribed by the NSAP.[44]

Although no other countries covered in this mapping exercise have measures in place for LAPs, most have a coordination function for local government. In **Tanzania**, there is a Ministry of Regional Administration and Local Coordination (Tawala za Mikoa na Serikali za Mitaa – TAMISEMI) which sits within the prime minister's office. This body issues licences to CSOs working in peacebuilding. Both **Rwanda** and **Uganda** have a Ministry of Local Government. A non-governmental voluntary membership organisation, the Rwanda Association of Local Government Authorities (RALGA), also helps to coordinate the work of the 30 districts of Rwanda.

South Sudan's subnational boundaries remain highly controversial, with some arguing that more states facilitate efficient decentralisation and others claiming that there is a greater risk of conflict when there are so many political boundaries.[45] The national government has established a local government board and local government ministries, as well as an advisor on decentralisation at the presidency level.[46] However, it is understood that this infrastructure is not necessarily functional.[47]

In **Mozambique**, where the government is highly centralised and confusion reigns over the delineation of the mandates of the positions of governor and secretary of state, coordination of any government work at the local level is weak, let alone that involving P/CVE interventions. No evidence was found that provincial or municipal authorities play any significant role in non-coercive responses to VE.

Civil society

In most parts of the region, civil society is provided with at least some space to operate. While the **Mozambican** government's engagement with P/CVE remains minimal, the authorities do leave CSOs alone to implement projects with relatively little political interference, as long as organisations are not seen to work in spaces considered the preserve of the state or attempt to alter the political status quo.[48] Similarly, in **South Sudan** both local and INGOs play an important role in delivering services to the public. 'The government appears willing to engage with civil society' but security remains firmly a function of the state.[49] While almost no P/CVE work is carried out in South Sudan, civil society is arguably well placed to lead the way in the future.

Kenya has an active civil society sector directly involved in P/CVE. CSOs have played an important role in the formation of P/CVE strategies at national and local level. Both national and county government recognise civil society as an important player, but it has been suggested that government inclusion of civil society has primarily been driven by a recognition that CSOs are the only stakeholder that can attract significant financial resources.[50] International donors have historically favoured providing funding directly to CSOs with P/CVE experience, rather than to government institutions.

Although initially excluded, **Uganda's** NTC has engaged civil society in its development of the national P/CVE strategy since 2019. The IGAD facilitated dialogue in Uganda though the CiSCAVE. This initiative has enabled two civil society figures to be represented at the NTC.
Somalia's civil society has become increasingly prominent in both prevention and disengagement efforts, with CSOs implementing P/CVE-oriented activities alongside their traditional focus on human rights and youth empowerment.[51] Gelot and Hansen (2019) describe the emergence of informal P/CVE brokers such as local elders and sheikhs, who often become 'mobilisers or quasi-social workers' and act as 'bridges' to rural areas or places where the state authority has little currency. This is in part because government-CSO relations have gradually improved, albeit from a relatively low baseline. Benefiting from years of donor investment, trust building, and mutual sensitisation, there is growing recognition from within state institutions of the utility, access and impact that civil society can provide. For instance, the FGS now convenes workshops and has adapted existing structures to help facilitate such partnerships, and there seems to be greater receptivity to human rights monitoring by civic activists. The Ministry of Justice has also compiled a list of religious leaders deemed suitable for P/CVE work.

In **Tanzania**, the government involves religious leaders and institutions in its P/CVE activities. Baraza Kuu la Waislam Tanzania ('The National Muslim Council of Tanzania' known by its Swahili acronym – BAKWATA) is particularly active in Tanzania's P/CVE space. BAKWATA has been critical in countering the influence of hard-line religious organisations in Tanzania such as the Ansaar Muslim Youth Center.[52]

Although **Djibouti's** constitution allows for freedom of association and there are indications that the government does cooperate with civil society, it may be difficult to use the P/CVE label when operating in the country.[53] CSOs must register with the Ministry of the Interior and obtain a permit. They are strictly regulated, with some forced to close in the past. Any organisations working on politically sensitive issues are unable to operate freely or to register with the authorities, but those that focus on social and economic development, including women's rights groups, are generally tolerated.[54, 55, 56]

There is optimism in **Ethiopia**. With the political changes in 2018, the country's leadership has increasingly allowed CSOs to engage in P/CVE activities. In March 2019, a new law for CSOs was passed – the Organisation of Civil Societies Proclamation No. 1113/2019. This replaced the Proclamation of Charities and Societies No. 621/2009 (2009 Proclamation) and removed some restrictions that constrained the work and political space of CSOs.[57] Crucially, it abolished a restriction on charities and societies not to raise more than 10% of their revenue from foreign sources.[58]

Private sector

Public-private partnerships are encouraged by the GCTF to tackle structural and economic grievances.

The private sector can also engage in P/CVE through corporate social responsibility (CSR) programmes, offering work experience and training to vulnerable communities. The Good Practices suggest that commercial entities may be well placed to respond to online VE threats.

Most of these proposals appear self-evident, especially considering the emphasis placed on economic drivers in some parts of the region. However, it seems that private organisations could be doing much more to support government and civil society in responding to VE in the region.

In **Kenya**, the private sector should be represented on CEF,[59] but there is little evidence that commercial entities have been adequately included.[60] Some suggest that large businesses on the Kenyan coast incorporate P/CVE sensitisation into their CSR initiatives, but the authors acknowledge that participation is ad hoc and the CSR activities essentially serve the interests of the company rather than the community. Moreover, these businesses are not included in the formal state P/CVE architecture. A RUSI study of four CEFs in Kenya identified only one private entity across the four steering committees.[61]

The private sector is critical in the **Mozambique** case, in particular oil and gas giants Total and ExxonMobil. Those in control of the vast liquified natural gas (LNG) reserves have been condemned by some as the cause of the insurgency or are at least accused of exacerbating it.[62] The extractive sector firms are said to have displaced whole communities (with inadequate compensation) and to have offered employment opportunities to outsiders, ignoring the pleas of locals. These large corporations are the ones with the money and ultimately can drive policy in the P/CVE space. They are also one of the few stakeholders which the national government listens to and they need stability to operate.[63]

International, regional, and subregional bodies

GCTF suggests that multilateral organisations should be responsible for providing guidance on good practice. In cooperation with member governments, regional and international entities can also provide training and enable the sharing of information and lessons learned.

Adopting a whole-of-society approach, the IGAD coordinated the elaboration of a regional strategy for P/CVE.[64] The IGAD secretariat spearheaded the document's development with contributions from focus group forums in the seven IGAD member states as well as **Tanzania**.[65] IGAD works with regional authorities to ensure that the strategy is incorporated into NAPs.[66]

Ultimately, the regional strategy should serve to streamline and deconflict national efforts to a transnational problem. The strategy provides guidance to national agencies responsible for countering VE and a structure within which these bodies can exchange ideas. It calls for legislation on P/CVE but prioritises 'the empowerment of non-state stakeholders including civil society organisations, the private sector, organisations of academics, and faith-based organisations'.[67]

In theory, the regional strategy is implemented by the IGAD Centre of Excellence for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (ICEPCVE). With initial funding from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), ICEPCVE was launched in **Djibouti** in 2018 to establish a centre institutionalising good practices on P/CVE.[68] The centre seeks to increase the capacity of IGAD member states in terms of research, strategic communication, community outreach, knowledge sharing and multiagency collaboration.[69] It is mandated to provide training, research, and technical support to those working in P/CVE and counter-messaging. Through the transnational security threats (TST) initiative, IGAD seeks to advance research and underpin evidence-based and effective policy and action on VE.[70, 71]

3. INCLUSIVE NATIONAL DIALOGUE

Lead an inclusive, consultative, multilayered, national dialogue on P/CVE

National dialogue on P/CVE should involve a variety of stakeholders at both national and subnational levels. Recommendations from the GCTF include engaging with actors who can provide practical experiences and local context. Good Practice 3 overlaps considerably with Good Practice 4. Here, we discuss dialogue and multistakeholder engagements under Good Practice 3, and reserve analysis of NAPs and strategies for Good Practice 4.

Understandings of the threat

Good Practice 3 calls for dialogue to establish a mutual understanding of the threat presented by VE. However, across East Africa, understandings of the threat of VE are often dependent on the priority interests of each stakeholder and rarely is there any consistency between national and local actors or between state and civil society in their interpretations of the problems. While national governments in East Africa often portray VE as a major threat to national security and one that affects every aspect of life, local actors – including civil society and subnational state authorities – may have to deal with much more immediate but mundane social grievances on a daily basis. This creates a disconnect in the prioritisation of the challenge.[72]

In **Mozambique**, where the national government's priority is to ensure that LNG operations resume, interviews suggested Maputo is not interested in hearing about the real situation on the ground in the province of Cabo Delgado. Understandings of the drivers of the conflict are driven by a specific agenda. Questioning the government's assertion that foreign actors are responsible, civil society calls for a greater focus on local socioeconomic grievances. The designation of the Cabo Delgado as a 'foreign terrorist organisation' provides further support for a military response and restricted opportunities for dialogue.[73] Ultimately, it does not appear that any inclusive platforms have brought together stakeholders to discuss the VE threat, with most actors continuing to work in silos.[74]

In **Kenya**, 'despite over a decade of interventions[...] the concept of VE remain[s] incompletely and inconsistently understood', with donor interpretations and preferences often applied regardless of whether they make sense in the targeted community.[75] As in **Mozambique**, government actors often understand VE to be ideologically driven, failing to recognise the many structural grievances that contribute to the problem.[76] Despite the national strategy to counter violent extremism (NSCVE) and CAPs and the many opportunities for dialogue between government and civil society, many national officials are also said to continue to view the issue solely in security terms.

There is also disagreement over the source of the problem in **Uganda**. Following a series of attacks in Kampala in late 2021, the government immediately asserted that the Allied Democratic Forces was responsible.[77] However, critics of the ruling administration feel that the fight against terrorism in Uganda is a guise to target opponents or a strategy to obtain international funding and support.

Inclusive dialogue

The ICEPCVE set a strong example in its development of regional strategy. Almost 800 people were involved, including government officials, relevant law enforcement experts, development practitioners, civil society representatives, community-based organisations, women's and youth groups, the private

sector, religious leaders, academics, and the media. Following an extensive peer review process, the document was validated in **Djibouti** in February 2017.[78, 79]

Among those countries without national frameworks in place for P/CVE, examples can be found of efforts to facilitate inclusive dialogue on related issues. In **Burundi**, community policing was introduced as part of the 2000 Arusha agreement and in 2014 mixed security committees were established, made up of local administration, the police, the judiciary, and CSOs.[80] These committees present an opportunity for any future P/CVE local action plans. Similarly, **Rwanda's** Ministry of Local Government (MINALOC) ensured that 2012 revisions to the decentralisation policy were participatory and consultative, laying out the responsibilities of each stakeholder, including national and local government, the private sector, development partners, and CSOs.

Inclusivity was demonstrated in **South Sudan's** lengthy 'national dialogue' initiative. The four-year exercise, encouraging community discussion on peace and stability, was completed in late 2020. The results surpassed expectations with the reach of its consultations and the participants' candid criticisms.[81] Over 20,000 people participated, including farmers, women, youth, and religious leaders.[82] However, P/CVE was not part of the agenda. The only dialogue on P/CVE specifically in South Sudan has involved CSOs. South Sudanese CSOs participated in discussions convened by the East Africa CSO hub. The organisations identified were not necessarily explicitly involved in P/CVE but worked in related areas, including gender-based violence. In August 2018, 40 organisations met at a launch event to discuss how they could contribute to P/CVE.[83] Shared priorities between government and CSOs were discussed and the potential for a national P/CVE strategy was mentioned. It is unclear if the South Sudan chapter of the CSO hub has met again to pursue these objectives.

Turning to those countries with P/CVE frameworks in place, **Somalia's** NSAP is currently being revised as part of efforts to create the Somali national dialogue, tolerance, and peace strategy. The focus is on greater inclusivity, consultation, and national input, particularly around more palatable, locally understood notions of dialogue and tolerance.[84] The new iteration and supplementary context analysis attempt to be more sensitive to community interests, with Somali stakeholders strengthening their expertise and encouraging subfederal and grassroots representation.

Kenya's NCTC has taken the need for inclusive dialogue seriously. The development of Kenya's NSCVE and CAPs – unlike earlier CT legislation – involved the participation of practitioners, CSOs and local leaders. Some have praised the national government for taking a leading role in coordinating regularly with foreign donors, county governments, CSOs, and faith-based organisations (FBOs).[85] The NCTC serves as the central focal point for each of these stakeholders. However, concerns remain that dialogue is still limited to the elite of society, with minimal effort made to include those effected by VE recruitment.[86]

At the county level in Kenya, the CEFs have tried to bring together the two levels of government with civil society whenever possible.[87] A social network analysis of the P/CVE space across four Kenyan counties found that the structure and make-up of county-level actors in the P/CVE space vary significantly.[88] For example, while in Mombasa, Nairobi, and Kwale, civil society plays a key role at the centre of the information sharing network, P/CVE in Nyeri is much more centralised, with most sharing through county government. The study suggested that while state actors were often perceived to be the primary source of information, relationships were rarely reciprocal and bilateral.[89]

4. NATIONAL FRAMEWORKS

Develop and promote an inclusive national P/CVE framework that reflects the perspectives of a diversity of national and local government and non-government actors

The dialogue discussed in Good Practice 3 should lead to a national P/CVE framework reflective of the needs of all stakeholders. Good Practice 4 lists the responsibilities of national government in response to the 2016 United Nations secretary general's plan of action to prevent VE which called for member states to develop 'a national plan of action to prevent violent extremism which sets national priorities for addressing the local drivers of violent extremism'.[90] The GCTF encourages national government to forge this framework, as well as providing the requisite training and resources for its implementation. Only some of the ten countries mapped have achieved this objective:

Burundi No national action plan on preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE)	**Rwanda** No publicly available national action plan on P/CVE
Djibouti P/CVE action plan reportedly completed and validated in 2020	**Somalia** The national strategy and action plan endorsed by the president in 2017
Ethiopia National action plan on P/CVE in development since 2018[91]	**South Sudan** No action plan on P/CVE
Kenya The national strategy for countering violent extremism first launched in September 2016. Review ongoing to develop revised version	**Tanzania** National P/CVE strategy in development since 2017, with support from the United Nations Development Programme
Mozambique No national action plan on P/CVE	**Uganda** National countering violent extremism strategy completed but not yet launched

Good Practice 4 recommends that NAPs should (i) be flexible and adaptable to local contexts, (ii) informed by international good practice, (iii) based on a shared vision of all stakeholders, (iv) identify local drivers to VE, (iv) include local actors and structures, (v) be coordinated by a lead agency, (vi) use shared vocabulary understood by both government and the public, (vii) and be linked to a coordination and governance mechanism to promote accountability.

Only the **Kenyan** approach comes close to implementing these recommendations. The NSCVE, advocating for a whole-of-society approach, was introduced within a year of the UN's call for action.[92]

The plan is coordinated by a national body in the form of the NCTC. CAPs consider the varied factors for VE and implementation is coordinated by CEFs, which facilitate further dialogue. A M&E framework has been introduced through the adoption of the objectives and key results (OKR) framework.[93] A committee was established to implement the plan through a cross-cutting, multiagency national campaign.[94]

The inclusion of CSOs, FBOs, political leaders, women, young people, and elders during the development of the CAPs was critical.[95] There were validation workshops and consultative meetings. However, there is a difference between inclusion and participation or ownership, and there is still room for improvement even in the Kenyan model. Evidence suggests that the involvement of grass-roots level stakeholders was often superficial and that many actors felt unduly excluded.

While the initial ten 'first generation' CAPs were lauded for their stakeholder engagement, the later RCAPs were produced in condensed two-and-a-half-day meetings led by a single Nairobi-based consultant.[96] Fifty county representatives were invited to these meetings but they were selected by the county commissioner who may have weak understandings of the local context.[97] The process was led by development partners and community voices were rarely heard.[98] Moreover, the fact that the CAPs are hosted by the office of the county commissioner is seen by some as evidence that county governments have not taken full ownership of the plans.[99] Local understandings of the problem and initiatives to tackle it were often incompatible with the provided template and with the views of the elite CSOs that were chosen to take part. When community representatives were present in the development of the CAPs, their ideas were sometimes left out of the final publication due to demands that the document align to the national strategy.[100] Finally, the NSCVE is said to have failed to recognise the potential for women's participation in its policies and programmes to counter VE.[101]

On paper, **Somalia** hosts a sophisticated, multi-tiered P/CVE architecture, filled with iterative scope – institutional linkages between national and local coordinating bodies; gender sensitivities; broad-based consultation; and cross disciplinary coverage that collectively reflects international good practice. Endorsed by president Farmaajo's administration in 2017, the NSAP provides a platform for organising the funding, contextualisation and delivery of P/CVE programming, in part by mentioning shared definitions, standards, strategic objectives, modalities, and stakeholder responsibilities.[102, 103] However, it seems a proportion of these arrangements are nominal at best, dependent on under-staffed, largely cosmetic structures that are arguably mimicking other functional systems of governance or policymaking.

Uganda's Ministry of Internal Affairs started developing its national strategy in 2017 with funding and advice from the UNDP and IGAD. The document has been completed but is yet to be launched publicly. Outlining plans for a PCVET national coordination office, it recognises the need for a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach, the importance of research and the potential role of non-state actors. There was initially only limited participation from civil society with the process led by political and security leaders. As recognised above, the NTC began to engage CSOs in 2019 during the validation phase. While the government had reportedly failed to adequately explore the unique drivers of VE in Uganda, CSOs are said to have brought this contextual knowledge. Several studies have noted that Uganda government's hostile relationship with civil society actors has been one of the greatest barriers to implementing an effective P/CVE policy to date.[104]

Reports suggest that **Djibouti's** national anti-terrorism task force – convened by the Ministry of Justice – completed a P/CVE national action plan in 2020.[105] The document was apparently validated at a workshop in December of that year.[106] Little information is available on the contents of the plan.

Other countries in the region have made minimal progress on a P/CVE-specific national strategy or action plan, nor the establishment of any national bodies to coordinate work in this space. However, in some cases, there are parallel initiatives and bodies that could present opportunities. For example, many countries in the region have established NAPs on women, peace and security to align with UN security council resolution 1325.[107] **Mozambique's** ADIN was established in March 2020 in an apparent effort to tackle historic socioeconomic injustice affecting the north of the country and represents the

best candidate for lead office or agency within the national government for P/CVE.[108, 109] The agency's resilience and development strategy for the North includes the implementation of P/CVE activities.[110] The strategy was reportedly shared with local authorities for consultation and its development is said to have been participatory.[111] However, operational progress has been criticised for being too slow, with ADIN focusing on infrastructure development rather than addressing social grievances.[112, 113]

5. LOCAL ACTORS, FRAMEWORKS, AND PROGRAMMES

Invest in local actors, frameworks, and programmes

National government

The GCTF encourages national governments to work with local partners on a voluntary basis, leverage local entities, support victims of terrorism, provide local authorities with flexibility, and provide training and resources to local actors to enable them to implement NAPs.

National governments in **Djibouti** and **Mozambique** have been accused of failing to listen to local authorities or to provide them with space in which to implement programmes. These centralised bodies do not communicate on P/CVE matters with local actors, preferring to maintain control over issues they consider matters of national security. Most interaction with local actors in Mozambique is conducted by national religious organisations, not the government.

In **Ethiopia**, the MoP collaborates with the European Institute of Peace to work with research institutions and universities across the country on research into ethnic extremism. These partnerships represent adherence with GCTF recommendations to leverage the expertise of local institutions. The national government in **Somalia** has strengthened its relationships with CSOs in recent years, convening workshops and adapting existing structures to help facilitate partnerships. The Ministry of Justice has also compiled a list of religious leaders deemed suitable for P/CVE work.[114]

Kenya's structure of government facilitates collaboration between national and local actors. National government administration officers (chiefs and their assistants), village elders and Nyumba Kumi officials facilitate government communication on P/CVE issues. This network enables local action and the NCTC provides a degree of flexibility and autonomy to local actors involved in implementing the CAPs. Kenya's NCTC sees CSOs as conduits for entry into any community. This can work but smaller CSOs complain that they are taken advantage of by the government to convey specific messages before they are simply discarded. One interviewee described this as 'divide and rule' with CSOs used when they are most needed but abandoned when surplus to requirements.[115] This is a common theme across the region: the co-optation of civil society, rather than genuine devolution of responsibility.

Local government

Good Practice 5 tasks local governments with developing LAPs, feeding back into the national plan and working through broader interventions to tackle the structural drivers of VE. Local authorities are expected to raise awareness regarding P/CVE frameworks and local programmes. Local focal

points should be identified to mainstream P/CVE efforts through existing services and to develop relationships and partnerships between relevant stakeholders.

In **South Sudan**, local actors play a role in peacebuilding, although this is rarely if ever related to P/CVE work and activity is not coordinated by local government. IGAD recognises that communities in South Sudan do not understand the problem of VE despite being vulnerable.[116] With no work ongoing at the national level, this is unlikely to change in the short to medium term.

In **Somalia**, the NSAP's discrete tiers are designed to be reciprocal and reinforcing, existing as feedback loops to ensure synergy, coherence, and a shared strategic logic while cascading autonomy and agency down to the grassroots. Some FMSs have developed their own platforms such as the Southwest Non-State Actors (SOSWENSA), a local CSO collective that predates any P/CVE agenda but offers opportunities for informal state cooperation.[117] Moreover, research suggests 'tight linkages between local development practitioners and administrators in both Jubbaland and Puntland lend a readily available network for coordinating prevention projects.'[118]

However, disparities in the budgets and administrative anatomy of FMSs distort the coverage and delivery of prevention activities. Newer states often comprise of insolvent shell structures or ghost ministries, and it is unclear how many of the P/CVE committees or associated positions are actually populated, leaving the representation and empowerment of regional stakeholders at risk of becoming minimal and skin deep.[119,120] That said, in some cases the relevant focal points have not only been appointed but include senior advisors to regional presidents, who can leverage their political heft and informal social networks to build resilient linkages that function irrespective of the[...] conflicts around them.[121] Furthermore, past research suggests that regions of Somalia such as Southwest, Puntland and Jubbaland may have made greater headway in developing their own approaches as they enjoy greater bureaucratic capacity, although these appear disbursed, urban-centric, ad hoc, and autonomous, operating outside the official confines of the NSAP.[122] Recent interviewees were uncertain whether such efforts had continued or amounted to anything substantive or sustainable.

Somalia's coordination unit has made progress at the subnational level bringing together religious scholars for a conference on peacebuilding, organising P/CVE training for police, creating a task force to improve P/CVE messaging, using radio and video for awareness raising, organising town hall meetings, and holding meetings with elders on P/CVE.[123] Working through local focal points, by 2020 the coordination unit had established ten district P/CVE platforms incorporating community and civil society alongside municipal authorities.[124] Finally, local government institutions, including line ministries for religious affairs, information, and the interior, collaborated in reworking education curricula in ways amenable to peacebuilding.[125]

As discussed above, **Kenya's** CAPs provide clear examples of good practice, replete with a coordinating body in the form of the CEFs. The more active of these steering committees work closely with existing local structures including interfaith bodies, youth groups and – to a lesser extent – private sector organisations. Significantly, the subnational action plans and interventions at a local level feed back into national strategy as and when it is updated.[126] The strategies 'function as living documents, subject to continual revision and adaptation, which help strengthen P/CVE coverage, collate good practice and lessons learned, and cater to Kenya's evolving threat landscape'.[127] County government relationships with CSOs in the P/CVE space vary considerably, characterised by suspicion in some parts of the country but collaboration in others.[128]

6. TRUST

Build and strengthen trust

The GCTF Good Practices recognise that trust is essential between all stakeholders and all levels of government. Authorities should build trust with local stakeholders through tackling factors which create mistrust and investing in interventions that build trust. They should also strengthen collaboration mechanisms. Inclusivity, transparency and dialogue are encouraged as ways that the national government in particular can establish greater trust. The document proposes that civil society consider facilitating constructive engagement around P/CVE issues.

Trust is idiosyncratic and dependent on individuals' personalities and personal relationships. However, at least two broad patterns are clear across the region. CSOs often have more trusting relationships with at-risk communities than state actors. This is said to be true in **Mozambique's** Cabo Delgado province and parts of **Kenya** most affected by VE recruitment.[129, 130] However, CSOs are heterogenous in their disposition, capacity, partnerships and networks, operational scope, and experience.[131] If a CSO is perceived by a community to be local, it is more likely to be trusted in Kenya where even organisations from a neighbouring county may be dismissed as lacking nuanced understanding.[132]

Civilian trust in law enforcement has been undermined in several parts of the region – including **Djibouti**, **Mozambique**, **Kenya**, **Burundi**, **Somalia**, **Tanzania**, and **Uganda** – by alleged abuses including extortion, looting, and threats.[133] Often security actors are accused of using engagements with communities to gather information rather than to exchange ideas. Frequent redeployments of security personnel are also cited as an obstacle to the establishment of relationships with communities. Various approaches have been taken to rebuild trust in law enforcement:

1. **Tanzania** has focused on community policing and the Nyumba Kumi initiative, but relations remain strained, especially in Muslim-majority regions.[134]

2. UNDP has worked on building trust and increasing dialogue between agencies in **Kenya**.[135] Neighbourhood 'police cafes' have also demonstrated encouraging outcomes in improving trust between law enforcement and communities.[136]

3. In **Burundi**, CSOs have promoted spaces for constructive engagement bringing together young people with police and hosting radio programmes. Although such programmes are not all directly linked to P/CVE, they have explicitly focused on building trust in the security forces.

4. The **Uganda** Muslim Youth Development Forum, supported by Finn Church Aid, led a platform for learning and exchange for how communities and security actors can collaborate on creating awareness of VE threats to build resilience to extremist narratives.[137] Allied Muslim Youth Uganda carried out interventions to encourage interfaith dialogue.

5. The **Ethiopian** Government recently amended the 2009 Antiterrorism Proclamation (ATP), prohibiting warrantless searches and the interception of primary communications.

6. In **Djibouti** community centres are able to boost social cohesion and resilience against VE and to work on strengthening partnerships with local police.[138]

Rwanda places emphasis on *Umuganda* (community work). Such activities have been implemented by Rwandan forces in Mozambique to reduce vulnerabilities to VE. In **Djibouti**, the US Department of State has noted an increasing role played by youth, sports, and culture as efforts are made to build relationships between different stakeholders.[139]

However, low levels of trust continue to restrict NLC in several parts of the region. Most **Ugandans**, especially in the Muslim community, are said to not trust the government and security actors as genuine partners in the fight against terrorism. In **Somalia**, a lack of trust and concerns over information security and confidentiality hinder systematic collaboration with the government.[140] In **Mozambique's** Cabo Delgado region, trust in the government has been eroded by decades of marginalisation.[141] The national government's ADIN initiative is seen by some as an effort to rebuild a social contract between the government and civilians across the north of the country. However, civil society and media access to affected communities in the north is strictly controlled by the national government.[142] State activities are opaque and built on patronage networks.[143] The government has imposed prohibitively high fees on journalists and has demanded new licences.[144]

In some parts of **Kenya**, community members are more likely to share sensitive information with FBOs and imams than with any government entity.[145] However, concerns were raised that political leaders view madrassas and mosques as 'fronts for recruitment' rather than 'positive spaces for moulding behaviour'.[146] Moreover, many religious leaders across the country are said to shy away from discussing VE during their sermons due to fear of upsetting either the government or VE sympathisers.[147] There is anecdotal evidence that county governments are trying to build trust with civil society. The Marsabit county government, for example, has established a steering group which meets regularly to deconflict the efforts of different CSOs.[148]

Although corruption allegations persist in the P/CVE space, the shift from securitised CT to non-coercive interventions and a whole-of-society approach in Kenya has contributed to greater trust between state and non-state actors. The NCTC relies on CSOs to 'both disseminate CVE messaging and restore public confidence in elements of the state itself.'[149]

7. INFORMATION SHARING

Facilitate appropriate information sharing between P/CVE actors while protecting privacy

Good Practice 7 notes that effective information sharing between actors in the P/CVE field should involve clear guidelines, frameworks, and principles that detail how, when, and what to share and with whom. Crucially, partnerships and collaborations between stakeholders are encouraged to facilitate information sharing about good practices while protecting privacy. In many ways, Good Practice 7 overlaps with Good Practice 8 which involves coordination, communication, and collaboration between all levels of government and society. This section however limits itself in outlining examples of good practices in the East African region in relation to information sharing between stakeholders in the P/CVE space.

Levels of information sharing between P/CVE actors vary greatly across the region, largely in line with the maturity of the operational context of P/CVE efforts. In **Kenya**, the NCTC carries out regular exchanges with donors, local authorities, CSOs, and other stakeholders regarding P/CVE policies and

programmes. With support from the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF), the NCTC recently established the Citizen Support Mechanism.[150] Theoretically, the platform can be used by CSOs to propose ways in which cooperation between civil society, the private sector, and government can be improved.[151] In addition, the NCTC recently launched a toll-free number through which members of the public can report suspicious activity.

Nevertheless, information sharing in Kenya between local entities usually depends on individual relationships and areas of expertise.[152] While CSOs come together to share information through the CEFs, competition for resources and limited funding opportunities can prevent them from being completely open and transparent spaces.[153] Regardless, these forums provide 'a bespoke, decentralised, and (nominally) inclusive platform for coordination, collective ownership, and information sharing between CSOs, (relevant) community representatives, and government officials at the county and national level via county commissioners'.[154]

At the regional level, several platforms have been established to promote information sharing:

> **1** The CSO hub was jointly created by the Global Center on Cooperative Security and IGAD's Centre of Excellence for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism.
>
> **2** ICEPCVE, as the **region**'s central repository for knowledge sharing and research, serves to strengthen 'cooperation, coordination, collaboration, training, dialogue, research and knowledge-sharing related to preventing and countering violent extremism through an inclusive and holistic approach'.[155]
>
> **3** The IGAD security sector programme (formerly the capacity building programme against terrorism), funded by the EU and other donors, is a partnership between civil society and government.

CSOs have also created platforms that facilitate information sharing. In **Kenya**, CSOs have partnered with the government to create platforms that serve as central repositories for ongoing P/CVE work in the country. A good example of this is the P/CVE research hub created by the Institute of Strategic Dialogue in partnership with the Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies. [156] The platform provides links to independent research carried out in Kenya's P/CVE space.[157] It also provides a space in which policy experts, practitioners, civil society, and academics can share ideas.[158] One interviewee from **Tanzania** noted that Mercy Corps in its collective resilience against extremism (CREATE) programmes established CSO-led coordination forums to promote information sharing among CSOs in the P/CVE field.[159] In **Uganda**, through the support of IGDAD, the CiSCAVE was established with the goal of promoting information sharing, cooperation, and collaboration.[160] However, it is worth noting that these mechanisms do not necessarily involve sharing between national and local government.

Tanzania and **Kenya** rely on community policing (through Nyumba Kumi initiatives) as a mechanism for information sharing between the communities and the security agencies. In theory, these schemes allow the national government to reach every member of every community. In Tanzania, Nyumba Kumi has been successful in helping the NCTC respond to the threat of VE.[161] However, in Kenya the scheme is broadly dependent on the personalities involved.[162] Notably, if Nyumba Kumi is seen as nothing more than an intelligence gathering tool for the state, then its credibility among the public is quickly eroded.

8. COORDINATION AND COMMUNICATION

Enable and promote effective coordination, communication, and collaboration among national and local stakeholders relevant to the design and implementation of a P/CVE NAP or other relevant national framework

Good Practice 8 encourages coordination, communication, and collaboration among national and local stakeholders in the design and implementation of P/CVE activities. It further urges national government to develop coordination platforms and mechanisms to act as connective tissue between the national and local stakeholders. The established platform, which would facilitate horizontal and vertical coordination, should have representatives from all government levels and society. Additionally, any P/CVE document should provide guidance on pragmatic elements necessary for a functioning P/CVE ecosystem, including a communications strategy, M&E, funding, and capacity-building.

Kenya's P/CVE infrastructure is, by and large, a good example of a model that supports coordination, communication and collaboration of stakeholders in the P/CVE space in a variety of ways. Kenya's national government, through the NCTC, assumes a leading role in facilitating communications between ministries, departments, and agencies in its P/CVE work, and most importantly in coordinating regularly with foreign donors, county governments, CSOs and FBOs. The NCTC has installed channels for local communication, such as the citizen support mechanism, and helps drive CAP implementation. While much of the groundwork is carried out by personnel at the county level, NCTC personnel guide the design of local plans. The centre provides a degree of flexibility to the county authorities, but ultimately it is the role of the NCTC to ensure that CAPs align with the NSCVE. In theory, the NCTC can communicate with local P/CVE actors through the county commissioners and governors.[163] This relationship can, however, be superficial when both sides avoid discussing the most difficult and sensitive issues necessary for progress.[164]

Still, at the local level in **Kenya**, the CEF provides a coordination function and a focal point for bringing together stakeholders from civil society, religious leaders and the private sector. The CEF is co-chaired by the county commissioner and the county governor, the most senior county government figure. In counties where the governor has personally taken an interest in P/CVE, all the resources of the county government are made available. The governors may be present at CEF meetings. This has been the case in Mombasa, but to a lesser extent Nyeri.[165, 166] However, in other cases, governors have a lot of arguably more pressing issues to confront, leaving P/CVE in the hands of the county commissioner. The success of the CAPs is often dependent on the personalities sitting in these postings.[167] Regular reshuffles and transfers in personnel, particularly at the senior level mean that those promoting CAPs may be transferred, leading to a stagnation in implementation.

In **Somalia**, the NSAP's implementation is delegated to a P/CVE coordinator housed in the office of the prime minister, who is tasked with synchronising the activities of various line ministries and managing

a coordinating task force or working group. The coordinator is meant to steer, regulate, and convene a cluster of individual focal points at the regional level, appointed and empowered by each respective FMS president. However, in practice, it is difficult to know how much of the structure translates into reality. State weaknesses including cash-strapped ministries, political fragmentation within and between different levels of government especially in context of elections, and real power exercised outside formal institutions. Within this context, it is largely unclear how many of the P/CVE positions are fulfilled and functioning versus how many simply exist on paper. Despite these shortcomings, there are nascent examples of progress in Somalia, for instance, the coordination unit has led several national-level conferences, police training, counter-messaging, various P/CVE district platforms, and consultation meetings.

In **Djibouti**, there is evidence of strong horizontal coordination within government, for example, between law enforcement and the Ministry of Islamic and Cultural Affairs. CT committees have also been established to coordinate the work of civil society alongside national government.[168] However, no information was obtained to suggest the involvement of local government in P/CVE work, likely due to the centralised nature of the state. In **Mozambique**, coordination and communication in the P/CVE field is considered highly centralised and prescriptive. There have been allegations of a silo mentality, with one interviewee arguing that 'everyone does their own thing' and there is 'little communication between the parts', particularly between the military and those involved in implementing softer development approaches.

9. NATIONAL LEADERSHIP, LOCAL OWNERSHIP

Balance national leadership and local ownership in P/CVE

Good Practice 9 recognises the need to have an appropriate balance between national leadership and local ownership of national P/CVE strategies and action plans for sustained local implementation. The GCTF NLC Memorandum encourages engagement between the national and local actors on principles that accentuate the national P/CVE strategies and plans and promote coherence and synchronicity among locally led initiatives.

A concern across several parts of the East Africa region is that P/CVE is inherently seen as a Western concept and one which may not align with the needs of local communities. If perceived as foreign, it is unlikely that local communities will ever feel that they genuinely own P/CVE efforts. In Somalia, the NSAP's underlying logic, design and satellite infrastructure all appear to be external constructs rather than the product of a domestically led agenda, leaving stakeholders dependent on donor funding, technical expertise, and Western-centric norms in ways comparable to other security and development processes across the country.[169] Despite this, there are clear examples of innovative interventions that have been essential to cultivating public engagement and outreach, encouraging local participation, developing networks of clerics and CSOs, identifying credible messengers, and promoting theological discourse as a vehicle for acceptance and dialogue. Additionally, FMS institutions – including ministries for religious affairs, information, and the interior – have collaborated in reworking education curricula in ways that are helpful to peacebuilding activities.[170]

MAPPING STRENGTHS AND CHALLENGES IN EAST AND SOUTHERN AFRICA

Similarly in **Kenya**, the NCTC has established a locally led structure, applying the Good Practice of inclusivity and local ownership to the Kenyan context through the CAP approach. Nevertheless, this remains under pressure due to a reliance on external donors. Yoni is particularly critical that the publication of the CAPs in English has marginalised those not comfortable using the language. It was argued that communities failed to interact with the documents because they are only accessible to an elite few that are conversant in English.[171] Moreover, it has been suggested that women were often only included due to donor demands rather than community preference.[172] The CAPs simply 'parroted the donor message'.[173] Ensuring local ownership has also particularly been challenging "within a 'top-down' framework that still subscribes to foreign norms, definitions, and priorities".[174] While there have been attempts to identify and support local entities in P/CVE work, too often the P/CVE ecosystem does little more than elevate a 'small group of local elite CSOs', that have become adept at appeasing the donor system and fail to grasp the needs of the communities in which they work.[175] One interviewee noted that monthly CEF meetings (if they take place) only involve elite CSOs where nothing 'trickles down to the grassroots'.[176]

10. FUNDING

Encourage sustainable funding to support local implementation of national P/CVE frameworks

P/CVE funding should be sustainable so that prevention efforts can address long-term risk factors, and research and practice in the P/CVE field can become evidence-based and more effective. Good Practice 10 calls for both national and local governments to support funding for actors in the P/CVE space, to create local implementation funds that support locally led P/CVE initiatives and include resources to promote consistency in the implementation of P/CVE efforts.

Across Eastern Africa, there is dependency on donor funding, with some national stakeholders simply assuming P/CVE budgets can exclusively be outsourced. The implication of this is the hampering of local ownership of P/CVE projects because of continued perceptions that P/CVE is a Western construct and also the limited sustainability of the projects.[177] Generally, domestic funding for P/CVE efforts in the region is minimal because of either a lack of genuine political buy-in or a focus on other priorities. For example, pressing concerns and competing donor interests in **South Sudan** and **Somalia** imply that P/CVE efforts can easily be siloed or subordinated to structural processes that demand greater investment, attention, and diplomatic bandwidth, e.g., stabilisation, state building, and conflict resolution.

In **Kenya**, the CAPs provides a structure through which funding can be managed and disaggregated. However, there is again an overdependence on development partners.[178] The CAPs are ostensibly aligned with the county integrated development plans (CIDPs) and national budgets but they are not adequately linked to public funding streams. A lack of centralised funding has also undermined the NCTC's role as the coordinating body.[179] Whereas CSOs in Kenya have a degree of independence from the NCTC as regards external financing, funding to CSOs is tied to P/CVE projects rather than strategy and is inadequate to the scope and scale of strategic aspirations. This undermines implementation and sustainability. In **Mozambique**, ADIN sources most of its funding for P/CVE work from bilateral and multilateral donors such as the World Bank but only a little from government.

Many CSOs in **Uganda** working in the P/CVE field rely on foreign sources of funding; from the UK government's conflict, stability and security fund, USAID, and the EU etc. These CSOs have established

a formal association, CiSCAVE, that among other things, helps to identify funding sources. One interviewee noted that CiSCAVE enabled member organisations to obtain grants from the UK-funded CREATE programme to support P/CVE work in Uganda.[180] The recently completed NAP will also provide impetus for donors looking for structures in which they can assist.

In **Ethiopia**, the passage of the new CSO law in 2019 abolished a restriction on charities and societies prohibiting them from raising more than 10% of their revenue from foreign sources.[181] This new law now offers an opportunity for the sector to grow, and supports the implementation of P/CVE activities.

11. TRAINING AND CAPACITY BUILDING

Provide or otherwise support tailored training and other capacity-building

Good Practice 11 encourages governments to provide support, including resources to the development and delivery of training and other capacity-building interventions to all relevant stakeholders. The training should promote professionalism in the P/CVE field and help in the development of innovative P/CVE initiatives that would overcome barriers to NLC.

Across the region, there has been a plethora of capacity-building interventions in the P/CVE field. However, most of these trainings, as with those in a wide-range of other security and development fields, are funded by international stakeholders.[182] In **Mozambique**, the EU is supporting various law enforcement agencies in partnership with the attorney general's office. The EU is further providing training on community policing and pushing for a draft P/CVE strategy. The MASC Foundation, with support from the US, is also providing training to civil society and the government in strategic communications.

The capacity of national governments in the region to support, design and deliver tailored training is generally hampered by a lack of technical, financial, and institutional capacity. Because of this, CSOs – with donor funding – have played an important role in delivering capacity-building activities to actors. In **Kenya**, for example, CSOs and NGOs deliver training to stakeholders, including the law enforcement agencies. These engagements have led to the development of training manuals for the security agencies and for media houses.[183, 184] Nevertheless, concerns have been raised about the risk of oversaturation. The number of workshops and conferences on P/CVE in Kenya has conceivably led to fatigue among practitioners. One interviewee said that 'training and capacity building is becoming boring' and that donors should 'stop spending money on hotels' but instead work with local community structures.[185] Even the best research on this subject is unlikely to make sense or be of interest to the affected communities. Capacity-building work must begin to take account of local understandings of these concepts and 'localise the big concepts'.[186] Efforts should be on training local and young peacekeepers who can take the message to the grassroots using their own words and in their own languages.[187]

In **Somalia**, there are concerns over the adequacy of scope and engagement from international stakeholders in relation to capacity-building activities. This is partly because of conflicting priorities and limited funding; especially due to budget cuts from traditional P/CVE advocates like the UK. However, there are examples of integrated intervention such as the USAID's transition initiatives for stabilisation+,

which channelled investment towards 'human capital' and mentorship arrangements at a local, state and federal level and alongside the UK's Somalia stability fund, nested P/CVE within wider forms of stabilisation and state-building.[188, 189] Various consultations and workshops have been held by UNDP and pilot projects pushed by INGOs or quasi-governmental bodies like the British Council.[190, 191]

At the **regional** level, the EU has been supporting various capacity building activities aimed at both civil society and governments. Regional training schemes are also convened by ICEPCVE.[192]

12. POLITICAL SUPPORT
Sustain political support for P/CVE efforts

Strong political support at all levels in the P/CVE field is critical to the implementation of national P/CVE activities. Good Practice 12 suggests that sustained political support will promote sustainable funding for P/CVE interventions and raise awareness of P/CVE efforts. Political goodwill is important in promoting understanding among key actors and reducing the politicisation of P/CVE efforts.

As previously mentioned, many national governments across the region consider terrorism incidents as a national security affair and therefore prefer securitised approaches rather than 'softer' P/CVE methods. Security or military personnel largely populate the relevant CT and P/CVE directorates and institutions, meaning many (but not all) personnel involved in activities to prevent VE are experienced in CT but potentially lack a comprehensive understanding of P/CVE. In environments characterised by state weakness or active conflict, P/CVE is also not necessarily considered a political priority amid more urgent, structural or systemic problems.

For example, in **Mozambique**, political will is said to be lacking with regard to P/CVE and efforts to establish ADIN and other longer-term solutions to socioeconomic grievances are frequently dismissed as ways for the national government to attract funding, rather than genuine attempts to improve the livelihoods of communities in the far north of the country. Additionally, a lack of viable opposition in the country contributes further to a reduced sense of urgency on the part of the government to deal with the crisis.[193] In **Uganda**, there appears to be widespread suspicion and a lack of trust between government-aligned politicians and the opposition. Observers note that there has been neither the political will nor any intentional effort to ensure stakeholders' input is incorporated in the development of the national P/CVE strategy. A lack of political collaboration could hamper the full implementation of the plan upon launch because all politicians, regardless of seniority or affiliation, should feel a sense of ownership of the strategy for it to be successful.

In **Kenya**, the political elite have broadly acknowledged the need for an alternative approach alongside counterterrorism operations in responding to threats of VE. The national government has been praised for its 'leadership and political will through the formation of a national task force'.[194] The president personally launched the NSCVE in 2016, making Kenya the first country in the region (and one of the first globally) to respond to recommendations made in the UN's plan of action to prevent VE.[195] While implementation has largely been funded by the international community, the creation of the NSCVE and CAPS were primarily locally driven processes. The NCTC works closely with the office of president, which ensures that planned activities are aligned with national political priorities.[196] There remain, however, internal disparities in support at the subnational level. For instance, there are discrepancies as regards the commitment of county stakeholders, with evidence showing that some CAPs or RCAPs are not receiving recognition by county assemblies or being included in the CIDPs. Without this formal buy-in from county authorities, P/CVE work is unlikely to be allocated any funding or be considered a local priority.

13. MONITORING AND EVALUATION

Enable the effective and sustained monitoring and evaluation of national and local P/CVE initiatives

Good Practice 13 encourages P/CVE actors at all levels to undertake effective and sustained monitoring and evaluation of P/CVE projects and policies to establish what works and what does not and, as a result, promote evidence-based policy implementation. Crucially, the Good Practice recognises existing conceptual and practical challenges in monitoring and evaluating P/CVE projects. The GCTF urges national governments to support local governments and local actors in monitoring and measuring the effectiveness of their plans and programmes. In particular, national governments should support local governments and other actors in gathering, generating, analysing, and sharing data to ensure P/CVE projects are productive.

Kenya presents an example of where M&E regimes have been integrated into both NAPs and LAPs. The CAPs provide a framework for short-term M&E of progress. Specifically, each CEF includes an M&E committee responsible for managing progress within pillars of the CAP. Since 2019, all CAPs have adopted an OKR framework.[197] Older documents have been redrafted to include this. The OKR framework should improve accountability and make goals clear to all involved, ensuring that the strategies are 'results and evidence-focused'.[198]

Many other existing institutional structures in the region have much weaker M&E set-ups. For example, **Somalia's** coordination unit is mandated to undertake M&E functions but lacks the internal capabilities to do so. **Uganda's** new P/CVE strategy and action plan propose indicators against each of the main deliverables. The documents state that an M&E framework will be developed and annual reports produced but details remain thin. In **Mozambique**, the NAP on women, peace, and security contains a comprehensive section on M&E, with guidelines stipulating that non-state actors should also be involved on an annual basis, but it is unclear whether proposed 'committees' have actually been established.

Good Practice 13 calls for all P/CVE information to be made accessible to relevant stakeholders. In cases where national P/CVE strategies have not been socialised among them (for example, in **Uganda** where the national strategy has not been publicly launched at the time of writing), little can be done to gauge progress. Much of the data available on P/CVE comes from outputs and evaluations conducted at the programmatic level, and from publications from CSOs and international donors. For example, in **Mozambique** USAID published an independently conducted evaluation of its *Tuko Pamoja* project online.[199] The EU also regularly circulates evaluation and lessons learned reports.[200] Although the publication of programme evaluations represents an important stride towards an understanding of what works and what does not, the M&E of national P/CVE strategies remains a work in progress in most of the countries where NSAPs have been instigated.

CONCLUSIONS

The GCTF Good Practices on NLC in the P/CVE space provide a snapshot of the ideal scenario. However, many of the recommendations are inter-connected and it is difficult to identify appropriate parallels in a region in which government approaches to P/CVE vary considerably. Only a few countries have even made a start in establishing national frameworks, let alone at the local level, with implementation even further behind.

Of the ten countries, only **Kenya** has made progress against every one of the Good Practices. Other countries, namely **Somalia** and **Uganda**, have produced national frameworks for P/CVE. Both outline whole-of-society approaches and talk about ways in which local actors and national governments can work together. However, neither have made significant progress in implementing these plans. A third category, including **Djibouti**, **Tanzania**, **Ethiopia**, and **Mozambique**, have engaged with non-coercive approaches to countering the threat of VE but lack the formal frameworks or legislation to guide work in this sector. Finally, **Burundi**, **Rwanda** and **South Sudan** have to date failed to engage in P/CVE and have conducted negligible work in this space.

Several significant obstacles to NLC stand out across the region.

1 Perhaps, most significantly, almost all financing for P/CVE work is provided by foreign donors. This means that countries are often constrained by an international agenda that may not be in alignment with local understandings and priorities.

2 Secondly, even when P/CVE is taken seriously, a predisposition for counterterrorist methods hinders genuine trust and engagement between government and non-state actors.

3 This contributes to a third related challenge: uncertainty over whether P/CVE sits within the domain of development or security. With security usually the responsibility of national governments, local actors are often nervous to engage in P/CVE.

4 Fourthly, decentralisation remains nascent in some contexts. This limits the authority of local actors and produces an imbalance in the power dynamics between the national government and local decision-makers.

5 A fifth significant obstacle is corruption which permeates every aspect of governance in some parts of the region, undermining trust and transparency.

6 Sixth, in some cases – particularly in **South Sudan** and **Somalia** – broader insecurity and ongoing conflict mean that P/CVE is rarely considered a priority.

7 Finally, despite the fact that CSO capabilities and knowledge of P/CVE remain heterogenous, a lack of technical capacity at the state level means that civil society is usually left with the burden of implementation.

A theme which cross-cuts conversations on P/CVE across the region is the lack of consistency in the use of terminology. Some respondents see the concept of P/CVE as a Western construct and may be suspicious of it. CSOs often differentiate between preventing and countering, suggesting that countering should only be carried out by government actors. Communities in affected areas regularly confuse P/CVE with CT. This lack of clarity leads to the conflation of VE and other forms of violence, including gang crime and communal clashes. It generates suspicion among beneficiaries, as well as fear and unease on the part of local government and civil society to engage in an appropriate response.

Despite the challenges and the lack of progress in some parts of the region, the mapping exercise identified key opportunities that can be leveraged for successful multistakeholder, multisector P/CVE interventions. In **Somalia**, where wider structural conditions constrain NLC, the core ingredients are in place and there are clear examples of organic, locally led initiatives that could benefit from external funding and technical support. In countries where minimal P/CVE work is ongoing, governments provide some space to CSOs and there is evidence that governments are trying to decentralise. Some governments will be able to leverage past peacebuilding work as they build P/CVE frameworks. **South Sudan** recently conducted inclusive national dialogue on a grand scale, for example. International partners have invested in education and entrepreneurship programmes with young peoples to prevent recruitment into armed groups by providing alternative livelihoods. **Rwanda**, **South Sudan**, **Uganda**, and **Mozambique** also have extensive experience in DDR that could prove useful in the P/CVE space.

There are also parallel strategies in place that present opportunities for working in P/CVE. Most significantly, several countries have experience drafting NAPs in response to UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on the women, peace and security agenda, and **Mozambique's** recently created

ADIN suggests the country is looking at alternative approaches to resolving the challenges connected to the insurgency in the north of the country.

Governments across the region must continue to explore how they can balance P/CVE with both CT approaches and broader development work. This is a critical challenge given the discrete logic, goals, audiences, and methods characterising different fields of intervention, and there may be competing or even contradictory priorities emerging between prevention and conflict resolution/peacemaking.[201] Regardless, evidence shows that P/CVE is neither effective nor sustainable in isolation. Mainstreaming P/CVE must involve more than simply relabelling existing programmes. Donors should ensure such activities complement or nest within comprehensive, multidisciplinary approaches where possible, or that more conventional programmes integrate P/CVE sensitivities (alongside those of conflict).

Leading the way and adhering to GCTF Good Practices, **Kenya's** NCTC is increasingly promoting a mainstreaming agenda. In May 2022, a symposium dedicated to mainstreaming P/CVE was held over three days to explore ways in which a P/CVE lens could be applied to existing governance initiatives. Representatives from national and local government, the private sector, religious leaders, affirmative action funds and civil society discussed how they could better include those most at risk of radicalisation and recruitment in their work to adopt a more sustainable approach to P/CVE.

In practical terms, it may make sense for LAPs to adopt a broader focus, considering local P/CVE drivers within wider development planning. Local-level interventions and localised action plans do not necessarily need to be labelled P/CVE to play a role; rather P/CVE objectives can be mainstreamed through other efforts to tackle social and economic grievances. Livelihood, employment and education initiatives implemented by local government certainly play a role in alleviating grievances.

National frameworks for P/CVE are an essential first step in facilitating NLC, but – even with everything in place – all actors must recognise that addressing the threat of VE is a long-term endeavour that requires continued commitment from all stakeholders.

ENDNOTES

1. https://www.thegctf.org/Portals/1/Documents/Framework%20Documents/2020/GCTF%20Memorandum%20on%20Good%20Practices%20on%20Strengthening%20NLC%20in%20PCVE.pdf?ver=2020-09-29-100315-357

2. GCTF 2020.

3. ICG 2021: 35; Chingotuane et al., 2021.

4. Life and Peace Institute 2020; Ali 2020.

5. Interview with Ugandan CSO representative, 13 April 2022.

6. South Sudan National Development Strategy 2018.

7. *Reuters* 2020; Africa News 2020; Pritchard and Verjee 2021.

8. Nhamirre 2022; Interview with diplomat in Maputo, 12 April 2022; Interview with academic, 7 April 2022.

9. Interview with academic, 7 April 2022; Interview with diplomat in Maputo, 12 April 2022.

10. Nyumba Kumi is a neighbourhood watch scheme built around clusters of ten households.

11. USAID 2022 forthcoming.

12. Ploch 2010.

13. Jett 2020.

14. Interview with diplomat in Maputo, 12 April 2022; Interview with civil society representative, 8 April 2022.

15. Interview with Juba-based think tank, 26 April 2022.

16. Ibid.

17. Felbab-Brown 2018b.

18. Hills 2014: pg. 169; see also Majid et al., 2021.

19. Interview with academic, 7 April 2022.

20. Crisman et al., 2020 also suggest that county representatives are excluded from the County Security and Intelligence Committee.

21. Yoni 2021.

22. Crisman et al., 2020: 28.

23. Reuters 2018.

24. The 2019 amendments to the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) and the 2014 Security Laws (Amendment) Act have strained relations serving as a reminder of the fragility of partnerships (Badurdeen and Goldsmith 2018; Sharamo and Mohamed 2020; Crisman et al., 2020; Yoni 2021). The changes provided unprecedented powers to the NCTC in the P/CVE space, dictating that all CSOs must register with the NCTC if they plan to work in P/CVE.

25. USAID 2022 forthcoming.

26. Balthasar and Osei 2018.

27. IGAD and Global Center 2019.

28. Sharamo and Mohamed 2020.

29. See GCTF Ankara Memorandum GP8.

30. See GCTF Ankara Memorandum GP9 and GP11.

31. Counter Extremism Project 2020.

32.   The development of the Kwale and Mombasa CAPs actually preceded the NSCVE. Indeed, the NSCVE drew extensively on these early documents.

33.   US Department of State 2016.

34.   US Department of State 2018.

35.   Interview with Tanzanian academic, 7 April 2022.

36.   UN Security Council 2018.

37.   In 2018, Somalia's Ministry of Information launched a digital counter-extremism centre to raise public awareness of peacebuilding projects and 'disrupt, refute or discredit' propaganda circulated by al-Shabaab (internal mapping exercise). This was partially established to mitigate criticism from 'moderate Somali clerics' concerned about the inadequacies of state messaging, promoting social media campaigns on the 'benefits of democratic institutions' to young audiences (Hassan 2018).

38.   Interview with civil society peacebuilder, 17 May 2022.

39.   Interview with Juba-based think tank, 26 April 2022.

40.   Yoni 2021.

41.   Yoni 2021, Jones 2020; Crisman et al., 2020

42.   Crisman et al., 2020.

43.   Sharamo and Mohamed 2020.

44.   Internal mapping exercise.

45.   Pritchard and Verjee 2021.

46.   Interview with Juba-based think tank, 26 April 2022.

47.   Ibid.

48.   Interview with diplomat in Maputo, 12 April 2022; interview with civil society representative, 8 April 2022; interview with civil society peacebuilder, 17 May 2022.

49.   Kessels et al., 2016: 41.

50.   Yoni 2021.

51.   Gelot and Hansen 2019.

52.   Meservey 2021.

53.   Kessels et al. 2016: 12.

54.   Freedom House 2021.

55.   Ibid.

56.   Public participation in governance reform is allegedly impeded by the central government, which limits civil liberties.

57.   Organisations of Civil Societies Proclamation. Proclamation No.1113/2019.

58.   Townsend 2019.

59.   Jones 2020; Crisman et al., 2020; Yoni 2021.

60.   Crisman et al., 2020.

61.   USAID 2022 forthcoming.

62.   Rawoot 2020; Lucey and Patel 2021; Chingotuane et al., 2021; Mukpo 2021; Dzinesa 2022.

63. Interview with civil society peacebuilder, 17 May 2022.

64. IGAD 2018.

65. The seven IGAD members are Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda.

66. The body also pledges to coordinate with other regional bodies such as the AU, and regional economic. communities including 'the East African Community (EAC), the Common Market for Eastern and Central Africa (COMESA) and the Indian Ocean Community (IOC)'. (IGAD 2018: 31).

67. IGAD 2018: 17.

68. Albany Associates Undated.

69. UNODC 2022.

70. IGAD 2018.

71. With the support of the Global Center on Cooperative Security, the ICEPCVE was critical in the establishment of the East Africa CSOs hub. The hub was created in February 2017 in recognition a trust deficit between government and civil society (*ReliefWeb* 2017; Global Center 2017). It was intended to provide an information sharing platform for the government and a wide variety of CSOs, rather than just a few that 'may not fully represent the diversity of perspectives, priorities, and experiences' (Global Center 2017: 1).

72. USAID 2022 forthcoming.

73. US Department of State 2021.

74. Interview with civil society peacebuilder, 17 May 2022.

75. USAID 2022 forthcoming; see also Badurdeen and Goldsmith 2018.

76. Idris 2020; Aroussi 2020; USAID 2022 forthcoming.

77. Selnes 2022.

78. IGAD 2018.

79. UNODC 2022.

80. Search for Common Ground 2022.

81. Mohajer and Deng 2021.

82. Ibid.

83. IGAD and Global Center 2019.

84. Interview with international expert, 12 April 2012.

85. Crisman et al., 2020: 9.

86. Interview with Coast-based academic, 7 April 2022.

87. Jones 2020; Yoni 2021.

88. USAID 2022 forthcoming.

89. USAID 2022 forthcoming; Interview with Coast-based academic, 7 April 2022.

90. GCERF undated.

91. US Department of State 2017.

92. Badurdeen and Goldsmith 2018; Counter Extremism Project 2020; UNDP undated.

93. Crisman et al., 2020.

94.   Counter Extremism Project 2020.

95.   Crisman et al., 2020.

96.   Interview with Coast-based academic, 7 April 2022.

97.   Yoni 2021; County commissioners are not local to the area and are frequently redeployed.

98.   USAID 2022 forthcoming.

99.   Yoni 2021.

100. Yoni 2021.

101. Aroussi 2020: 677. Aroussi explores the challenges of integrating the P/CVE and Women Peace and Security agendas in Kenya.

102. This includes streamlining institutional arrangements, improving technical capacity at a national and subnational level, strengthening research, developing robust M&E regimes, and designing clear communication campaigns.

103. Internal mapping exercise.

104. For example, Dyrenforth 2018.

105. US Department of State. Country reports on terrorism 2020: Djibouti.

106. US Embassy in Djibouti 2020.

107. Burundi, Kenya, Mozambique, Rwanda, South Sudan, and Uganda have all developed NAPs on WPS (https://1325naps.peacewomen.org/).

108. Economist Intelligence Unit 2021; Club of Mozambique 2021.

109. GCTF 2020.

110. Nhamirre 2022.

111. Interview with civil society peacebuilder, 17 May 2022.

112. Buchanan-Clarke 2021.

113. Interview with civil society peacebuilder, 17 May 2022.

114. Gelot and Hansen 2019.

115. Interview with Coast-based academic, 7 April 2022.

116. IGAD 2018.

117. Internal mapping exercise.

118. Ibid.

119. Interview with international expert, 12 April 2022.

120. Ali 2020.

121. Internal mapping exercise.

122. GCERF 2020.

123. Ali 2020.

124. Ali 2020.

125. Interview with international expert, 12 April 2022.

126. Crisman et al., 2020.

127. Jones 2021: 8.

128. USAID 2022 forthcoming.

129. Interview with civil society representative, 8 April 2022.

130. USAID 2022 forthcoming.

131. Ibid.

132. Ibid.

133. Saferworld 2020; Freedom House 2021; IJR Policy Brief 2021; Lucey and Patel 2021; Whitehead 2021; ICG 2022; USAID 2022 forthcoming.

134. Arguably more successful than Kenya's neighbourhood watch scheme of the same name.

135. Crisman et al., 2020.

136. Jones 2020.

137. PML Daily 2021.

138. Kessels et al., 2016: 12.

139. US Department of State 2020.

140. IGAD and Global Center 2019.

141. Interview with civil society peacebuilder, 17 May 2022; Interview with academic, 7 April 2022.

142. Idris 2020; Lemos and Rawoot 2021; Zenda 2021.

143. Interview with diplomat in Maputo, 12 April 2022.

144. Zenda 2021.

145. USAID 2022 forthcoming.

146. Ibid.

147. USAID 2022 forthcoming; Interview with CSO in Marsabit, 8 April 2022.

148. Interview with CSO in Marsabit, 8 April 2022.

149. USAID 2022 forthcoming.

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153. USAID 2022 forthcoming; Sharamo and Mohamed 2020.

154. USAID 2022 forthcoming.

155. UNODC 2022.

156. Counter Extremism Project 2020; CVE-Kenya.org.

157. Counter Extremism Project 2020.

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159. Interview with academic from Tanzania, 7 April 2022.

160. Interview with civil society representative, 13 April 202.

161. Walwa 2021.

162. USAID 2022 forthcoming.

163. Interview with Coast-based academic, 7 April 2022.

164. Ibid.

165. Crisman et al., 2020; Jones 2020.

166. USAID 2022 forthcoming.

167. Interview with Coast-based academic, 7 April 2022.

168. Personal communication from Djiboutian CSO, 31 May 2022.

169. Interviews conducted with three international experts in April 2022.

170. Interview with international expert, 12 April 2022.

171. Interview with Coast-based academic, 7 April 2022.

172. Idris 2020; Interview with Coast-based academic, 7 April 2022.

173. Interview with Coast-based academic, 7 April 2022.

174. USAID 2022 forthcoming; see also Badurdeen and Goldsmith 2018.

175. Badurdeen and Goldsmith 2018; Jones 2020.

176. Interview with Coast-based academic, 7 April 2022.

177. Aroussi 2020.

178. Yoni 2021.

179. Crisman et al., 2020.

180. Interview with a CSO representative from Uganda, 13 April 2022.

181. Townsend 2019.

182. For example, REINVENT (https://www.reinvent-kenya.com/); EU P/CVE training (https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/projects/european-union-thematic-training-preventing-and-countering-violent-extremism); STRIVE programmes (https://www.eeas.europa.eu/node/47387_en); USAID's NIWETU (https://www.usaid.gov/site-search/NIWETU_Fact_Sheet_Feb_2020.pdf)

183. Fisher, Range and Cuddihy 2020.

184. KECOSE 2020.

185. Interview with Coast-based academic, 7 April 2022.

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196. Crisman et al., 2020.

197. Ibid.

198. Ibid. 10.

199. USAID 2022.

200. For example, lessons learned from STRIVE Horn of Africa (https://ct-morse.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Strive-Lessons-Learned-Report-Final-Version.pdf) and STRIVE II Kenya (https://static.rusi.org/lessons_learned_brochure_digital_0.pdf).

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